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Abstract 
Free trade benefits us all and is firmly guarded by the WTO. In earlier research we 
showed that complaining at the WTO is not always induced by objective facts. We argue that 
if this is actually the case, trade is not sustainable as it should be, but disruptive instead. It 
implies that sub optimality is introduced, distorting the beneficial effect of free trade known 
as in the theory of comparative advantage. In this paper we look at the complaining behaviour 
on the Eurasian continent and we try to distil driving forces. We are particularly interested in 
the role of the European community, one of the major complainants. Can we explain this 
behaviour in terms of home bias, as we found for several other nations, or is this complaining 
related to objective facts which are subject of international treaty’s such as airplane safety?  
In our earlier exploratory research we worked on data of 28 countries which we analysed 
using correlation and stepwise regression, finding interesting results. We actually distilled a 
trend involving home bias. We again pose the question if Eurasian complaining is actually 
about for instance airplane safety or do also Eurasian countries use treaty’s like this to steer 
away from competition? Is this leading to disruptive trade or the opposite, making trade more 
free and sustainable? We use statistical analysis and report on a number of incidents, and 
eventually focus on the role of Foreign Direct Investment in the subset of 28 countries versus 
Eurasia. We explain why results between the subsets differ to a considerable extent and show 
convincing examples of home bias induced policy. 
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Introduction 
The current literature still needs to explore the relationship between the number of 
complaints filed at the World Trade Organization, WTO and the economic structure of the 
WTO members at the macro level. This paper explores the phenomena of the trade complaints 
and factors which induce and motivate to file complaints. The purpose is to gain an insight 
into the factors which are correlated with the complaining behaviour of the WTO member 
countries, Eurasian countries in particular.     
The WTO, with the 159 members and 25 observers champions the cause of an open 
economy with trade liberalization policy. The WTO also facilitates the necessary 
organizational infrastructure for the members who are perceived as not being kept to the 
treaties. The WTO is an international institution championing free trade. WTO states as one 
of the objectives: ''Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious ways of encouraging 
trade; these barriers include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or 
quotas that restrict quantities selectively.'' Discouraging 'unfair' practices, such as export 
subsidies and dumping products at below cost to gain market share is a complex issue. The 
rules trying to establish what is fair or unfair are very difficult.  
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Box 1: The case on Solar Panels is a justified complaint at the WTO because the Chinese heavily subsidise the 
production, making trading solar panels dumping in legal terms. In this case an agreement can do what it is 
supposed to do: ensure and regulate free trade. 
 
A country WTO member may decide to complain against a particular country when it 
perceives trade barriers. These trade barriers, which are most probably against a certain treaty. 
 Alternatively, it might also be a suspicion, when a country suspects an element of 
barrier against a treaty. It defines a WTO complaint, justified or otherwise, as a legal measure 
with strong national political backing and hidden economic motives. It is not possible to 
capture the hidden economic motives directly. It may be a sign of induced home bias. The 
action of lodging a complaint may be an unintentional or even an intentional induced home 
bias action. Based on the outcomes of the analysis of a subset of 28 countries, an odd set with 
relatively many South American countries and also a big economy like India versus Eurasia 
and we present three cases. We draw some tentative conclusions. 
 
Literature and theory overview 
An open economy implies openness to the foreign trade, export and import activities. 
The export results in the inflow of money and imports cause outflow of money. Rationally 
each country wants to maintain or maximize its potential of its share in export and balance it 
with import if not reduce imports. The economic circular flow for an open economy consists 
of five sectors; namely the household sector, the firm sector, the financial sector, the 
government and the external sector. It is assumed that the countries, which have joined WTO 
have been actively busy with the opening of the economy, making free trade free as much as 
possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China – EU: Solar Panels  
European solar panel manufacturers have escalated their legal campaign against Chinese rivals 
by filing a fresh trade complaint in Brussels accusing them of receiving illegal government 
subsidies. 
 
The anti-subsidy complaint comes just weeks after the European Commission, the EU’s 
executive arm, roiled trade relations with Beijing by opening a separate anti-dumping 
investigation against the Chinese companies (Reuters, 2013). 
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Diagram1: Chain of reasoning on complaints induced by home bias, a theoretical reasoning on FDI (Foreign 
Direct Investment) 
 
Households own the assets of the economy and distribute their incomes to consume 
and save. Exchange of goods takes place in perfectly competitive markets when it comes to 
international trade. The firm sector sells their products to household and to firms in the 
external sector. The household sell their labour and assets to the production sector. The 
available factors are utilized to the optimum level. The saving is made by the household 
sector to the bank, which is distributed by the bank to the firm sector.  Furthermore, the 
countries have realized that import substitution is less optimal for the growth process than an 
export promotion strategy for growth. Being a part of the globalizing world and as WTO 
member, it is imperative to lessen trade barriers. 
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Box 2: The Textile crises of 2005 is a clear example of home bias induced policy. Due to 
comparative advantages the production of textiles is shifting to the East. The production of these textiles is not 
subsidised, but is just very much cheaper to produce textiles in Asia in 2013 due to low labour costs. 
 
The government sector has to fulfil the wishes of not only the household sector, which 
is a supplier of labour but is also expected to be able to facilitate the firm sector. The firm 
sector should be able to produce the goods at competitive prices. Furthermore, the external 
sector demands through WTO that there is strict adherence to the trade treaties and 
commitment to free trade. This may lead the government to the dilemma. If a country 
objectively has a commitment to free trade, she also expects a trade with a country with a 
commitment to free trade. A commitment to a free trade may be an unpopular policy initiative 
leading  to the visible protest and perceived loss of employment opportunities. A country is 
open to foreign trade due to the various advantages of international trade. Most importantly, it 
is able to fulfil the demand of its household and firm sector. 
The empirical study results indicate that massive capital accumulation of the export 
sector brought down Singapore's unemployment rate in the four decades before open trade 
policy was established. (Kee and Hoon, 2004). Strong possible explanation for the strong 
European agricultural protection or the EU trade policy is home bias (Eriksson 2006).War on 
Want is an international alliance of NGOs concerned with issues of justice and with historical 
links to the labour movement. They are at the forefront of the trade justice movement 
claiming that free trade threatens the employment around the world. 
The main areas of employment in services associated with exports were similar to 
those areas most prominent of employment in all service activities in Indonesia. The huge 
contribution of trade to employment is presumably a reflection of the labour intensive 
character of the trade activities associated with exports: exports of primary commodities for 
example, are likely to engage a large number of traders. (Manning & Aswicahyono, 2012). 
For the exporting country when the foreign demand for its product increases, it needs to 
undertake the production activities, which implies that the employment opportunities in the 
exporting nation are likely to increase. Assuming all other factors like international 
competitiveness of the importing nation remains equal, its import increases. This may lead to 
a fall in the domestic demand for almost substitute domestic good or the domestic alternative 
for the foreign product, which is not competitive in international trade. This might result in 
 
China – EU textile crises 2005 
 
Chinese clothes exports to EU 5 September 2005 Millions of textile and clothing goods from China are being held 
in European warehouses, because of a dispute over import quotas Chinese-made bras, blouses and T-shirts are 
piling up at customs checkpoints across Europe, having already bumped up against import limits set earlier this 
year. A team of officials from the European Union has been in Beijing trying to negotiate a way out of the crisis, 
so far to no avail. But European retailers are just as annoyed at the quotas as the Chinese.... 
 
 
This showdown has been brewing for a while. When China became a member of the WTO in 2001, it did so under 
special terms that allowed importing countries to impose short-term “safeguards” on Chinese goods until 2013 if 
they could show those goods to be causing “material injury” to domestic producers. And separate measures for 
textiles allow safeguards to be imposed whenever imports threaten “market disruption”. The expiry of the previous 
quota system made it inevitable that countries with big textile industries—such as France, Spain and Italy—would 
press for quotas to be imposed. At best, the quotas are only delaying the inevitable. 
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the decrease in production and thereby decrease in the employment opportunities in the 
importing countries. This may further result in trade barriers by the importing countries.  
The economic growth and development is observed to commensurate with sector 
shifts in an economy. The primary sector loses its important share in the process of economic 
growth. As the country develops economically, a larger share of GDP is contributed by the 
secondary and tertiary sector. The importance of the primary sector declines in the generation 
of national income. The firm and, the consumer demand for foreign goods are purely rational 
choices, motivated by the maximization of budget. The government objectives are also to 
ensure the growth and development, structural unemployment is essential to tackle. For a 
developing economy there are many obstacles, the problem of unemployment and the creation 
of structural employment opportunities is one of the most important. 
There have been several studies about the role of foreign direct investment FDI in the 
economic development, a topic beyond the scope of this paper. An open economy with 
favourable corporate governance is expected to receive higher FDI and we expected it to be 
positively correlated to the number of complaints. We provide a chain of reasoning about the 
way in which international property rights or soaring foreign direct investment could lead to 
complaints  of a WTO member country in diagram one. Please recall that the theory of Pareto 
optimality states that free trade is the optimum way of maximizing the welfare of the trading 
countries. The distortion in terms of any tariff, any non-tariff or voluntary trade restriction 
would distort the mechanism leading to sub optimum or disruptive trade. How this disruptive 
trade may arise based on other than objective complaint behaviour is illustrated in the 
reasoning in diagrams one and two. In the era of globalization and trade liberalization the 
protectionism is certainly not a policy that commensurate with WTO membership. The WTO 
stands for multilateral treaties and for lack of barriers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Bent Cucumbers: Isn’t second rating odd shaped cucumbers a way of frustrating competition, protecting 
the home based industries as in the case of the textile crises of box 2? 
 
The international labour organization studies by Janse en Salazar-Xirinachs mentions 
that " .. Perceptions of the employment impact of trade are probably one of the main 
explanations for the current stalling in multilateral trade negotiations...." This is not 
necessarily explicit and trade negotiators do not tend to put employment concerns forward as 
a reason for inflexibility in negotiation positions. This even though there is consensus among 
the economists about the role of an open economy in economic growth. The trade 
liberalization, the export promotion rather than import substitution did prove to be a key to 
economic success. To attain the Pareto optimum based on comparative advantages in the 
international trade implies absence of tariffs or any other barriers, leading to efficient use of 
       European bureaucracy: Should the EU Sell Bent Cucumbers?  
DPA For years, EU critics only had to mention the “Bent cucumber rule" whenever they wanted to mock 
perceived European over-regulation. Now, the EU's agriculture minister has suggested scrapping a number 
of rules to ease the rising price of food. Regulation first-class unbent European cucumbers. 
  
According to European Commission Regulation No. 1277/88, if a cucumber bends more than 10 
millimetres 
per 10 centimetres (0.4 inches per 4 inches) in length, it cannot be categorized as "class one" and may 
therefore only be sold as a second-rate cucumber. But who wants to buy one of those? Most second-rate 
cucumbers -- at least according to conventional wisdom -- never make it to market. 
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resources and development of trade specializations which leads to welfare gains of the trading 
countries. All Pareto-efficient allocations are thus characterized by production efficiency 
(Keen and Kotsoginannis 2012).  
Research question and methodology 
This study examines the possible causality which might exist between the complaints 
lodged by the member countries of world trade organization henceforth WTO and indicators 
of economic structure at macro cross-country level with a dataset of 28 countries. In our 
research we found an actual trend involving home bias. We repeat former analysis and in our 
modelling efforts we take the number of complaints at the WTO as our dependant variable. 
There are clear cases of complaining at the World Trade Organization in which home 
bias is plausibly the reason for complaining, rather than objective criteria of the rules of trade 
agreements as mentioned in this paper. Next to home bias in individual cases induced home 
bias leading to complaining at World Trade Organization (WTO) might also be a trend.  
We formulated the following  research question: 
"Which factors are responsible for the complaining behaviour of Eurasian WTO 
member countries, if not objective factors, which are the other factors which could explain the 
complaining behaviour of Eurasian WTO member countries?”  
Using correlation and stepwise regression analysis a dataset on 28 complaining 
countries is analysed in earlier research. The number of complaints at the WTO was the 
dependent variable in exploratory modelling. Independent variables are various variables on 
economic structure. Structural Unemployment (SUN), Agricultural Import Share (AIS), 
Current Account Balance (CAB) , International Property Rights (IPR) and Foreign Direct 
Investment  (FDI) turned out to be significantly related to the number of complaints 
(Samplonius & Waalkens, 2013) in this subset of 28 countries basically from all over the 
world. There are strong indicators that complaining at the WTO is at least partly induced by 
other than objective factors, we refer to the cases in boxes 2 and 3 in this article. These factors 
other than objective factors are in these cases induced home bias, leading to disruptive trade.  
We investigate the correlation between level of gross domestic product per capita and 
various other indicators of economic structure and -development and its linkages to the 
number of complaints. The level of development is closely associated with the employment 
structure in the economic sectors, share of sectors in export and import and other factors like 
FDI, CAB, SUN AIS and IPR. This includes an examination of the number of complaints and 
the employment structure of the WTO member countries. We have to bear in mind the level 
of aggregation of the data. The association between the trade barrier complaints and economic 
variables can be estimated by carrying out correlation and regression analysis. Furthermore 
presented cases are part of the analysis.  We draw the regression table, after we enter variables 
on economic structure in a regression equation using step-wise regression to estimate how 
much variation we can explain using our Eurasian data. The significant correlation between 
the number of complaints as a dependent variable and a number other independent variables  
CAB, SUN, AIS, IPR and FDI is estimated by regressing the cross –section of economic 
structure indicators on a set of regressors of two types: a measure of economic structure and 
control variables. T testing has been used to asses if these variables differ significantly 
between the subset of 28 countries and the Eurasian subset.  
 
Exploring the Eurasian data 
We explored the data of our correlation table.  Each variable was entered into the 
regression equation stepwise. In this way we tested the outcome of the  explorative modelling 
model of the research on 28 countries. As we applied the statistical approach mentioned 
above, we started with inspecting the correlation table containing various economic 
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indicators. We correlated the number of complaints to these economic indicators that relate to 
the structure of the economy in the subset of Eurasia.  
Significant correlations from the correlation table are: 
• The percentage of fuel and mining share and number of complaints against or the 
frequency of respondents is 0.40 at 0,05 level,  
• The percentage of agricultural import share and % of agriculture X share correlated at 
0,697 at 0,01%,  
• The agricultural imports of the Eurasian countries go along with the agricultural export 
share. This could be also the result due to the agricultural barter trade which is not 
uncommon in the international trade, 
• The percentage of Agricultural Import Share and the percentage  of  Manufacturing Share 
in Export at 0,577 at 0,01 level, 
• The Agriculture Import Share AIS with manufacturing share in exports. The Eurasian 
countries have to allocate the scarce resources in the manufacturing  sector and higher the 
export share higher the need for agricultural imports,  
• FDI and import share in the world trade is positively related 0,507 at 0,01 level, 
• FDI and export share in the world trade is related 0, 438  at 0,05 level. 
• FDI is in T testing significantly different (much higher) for our 28 countries versus 
Eurasia. 
The Bent Cucumber case is an example of a conflict on agricultural products, actually, 
a large share of complaints are related to agricultural products. Out of 366 GATT complaints, 
at least 159 have direct concern with the agricultural sector; 43%. In the case on Bent 
Cucumbers it is clear that the policy to rate differently shaped cucumbers second class is 
home biased; there is no relation between shape and quality of cucumbers. Supplemental data 
on the discussion can be derived from an analysis of our three short case studies of 
complaining at the WTO presented in this paper (See Boxes 1-3 and the next section on 
results).  
The number of filed complaints correlated to the number of frequency of being 
respondents is very high: 0,986 at 0,01 level. Apparently the WTO trade platform works as an 
arena where when a country complains against a certain country is also likely to be 
complained against, though not necessarily by the same trading partner. High foreign 
investment means dependency and probably domestic pressure against highly competitive 
foreign industries, as we found in our earlier research on 28 countries, but FDI is much higher 
in Eurasia, yet we find no effect on the number of complaints, as in our subset of 28 countries. 
Then why the mechanism towards complaining as observed for 28 countries seems to be 
different for Eurasia? 
 
Results case research, regression and T-testing 
We tried to fit regression models including the explanatory variables IPR, CAB SUN, 
AIS and FDI, but using stepwise regression but none of these variables was significant. We 
used a T test and found one variable to be significantly different: FDI. FDI is significantly 
much higher in Eurasia.  
It turns out that the EU is the biggest complainer by far.  Furthermore we asked which 
economic factors explain the variation in complaining. In our earlier analysis of 28 countries 
(EU not included) IPR, CAB, SUN AIS and FDI, using an odd data set with countries all over 
the world, including South American countries and India, turned out to be explanatory 
variables of the number of complaints. Unfortunately data on the Eurasian continent IPR, 
SUN, FDI and CAB are measured in most countries but lack in the case of the European 
Union as a whole. At the same time the EU act as a complainant like any other country in 
Eurasia. This has hampered our analysis for sure. We modelled the variables and entered 
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these in regression equations that turned out to have a bad fit. FDI for Eurasia proved to be 
significantly different than in the case of our 28 countries.  
Concerning the textile sector (Box 2 on the Textile crises), sector structure in Eurasia 
has to adapt to a new reality. Low cost labour intensive production will continue to be 
pressured by low labour cost countries, despite quotas that cannot delay the inevitable if 
countries are truly committed to free trade and want to lessen trade barriers. Yet, perceptions 
of the employment impacts of trade liberalization are in many capitals an important 
determinant of the rank trade takes on the list of priorities for policy action because: "Trade 
liberalisation is unlikely to automatically create job miracles since successful integration into 
world markets tends to go hand in hand with the adoption of new technologies and 
productivity increases" (Marion Jansen & José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, 2012). 
Returning to Foreign direct investment: FDI was in the eighties and nineties of the last 
century an affair of Europe – America – Japan (Baoumi & Lipworth,1997), so naturally still 
prominent in Eurasian data because also now these two countries and the EU are still the most 
important investors in FDI in the world economy. Besides this, high FDI is in Eurasia in 
mineral and oil exploitation (in Georgia, having no oil itself, FDI is about oil transportation) 
and many greenfield investments are made, that don’t directly affect the employment situation 
in Eurasian countries as FDI does in South American countries and for instance India. The 
population of Eurasia is largely in favour of FDI, our 28 countries are clearly much more 
divided on this subject and prove to have different economic structures. Integrating with 
regional partners has allowed  a country like Kazakhstan to respond to the disruptions 
resulting from the 2008-09 global economic crisis not because of FDI but because the lack of 
it. “The crisis has thinned down the flow of FDIs (foreign direct investments) (…) Far from 
being a regression to Soviet-era stagnation and protectionism, integration with Kazakhstan’s 
Eurasian neighbours will help expand the country’s emerging global economic role.” 
Whereby new FDI is sought and is most welcome (Aris, 2013). 
FDI is related to the openness of the economy. The openness is related to the extent of 
export and import as shown. Higher the export and higher the import greater FDI can be 
expected in an average Eurasian country, though it can be observed that for export share the 
relation is somewhat weaker than for the import share for Eurasia. “Overall, FDI inflows to 
developing markets were only slightly down in 2012 year-on-year, while some markets, like 
Africa and labour-intensive economies in Eurasia like Vietnam, bucked the trend and saw 
increases. Meanwhile, investment into developed economies plummeted 32% to $561bn – a 
level last seen almost 10 years ago.” (Aris, 2013). A large share of forty-two per cent of 
Russians say foreign investments will help their economy, while about a minority share of 
one third (34%) say these investments will hurt the economy (Ray & Esipova, 2012). 
Opposite sounds can be heard in India: “Traders in Malgodown, the state's biggest wholesale 
market, have vehemently opposed the central government's decision to allow foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the retail sector. Traders said the decision will affect local traders and 
small enterprises.” (Jaiswal, 2012) 
“The BRICS countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) 
continued to be the leading sources of FDI among emerging investor countries. Flows from 
these five economies rose from $7bn in 2000 to $145bn in 2012, still accounting for only 
about 10% of the world total. In the ranks of top investors, China moved up from the sixth to 
the third largest investor in 2012, after the United States and Japan,” (Aris, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
The three presented cases show a picture of home bias being more than once a plausible 
explanation for EU trading policy. The case of Solar panels shows how complaining at the 
WTO is supposed to work: an objective anti-dumping complaint about a violation of a 
multilateral treaty. Though we could not capture home bias in our quantitative research, our 
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qualitative case research reveals a worrying tendency in the light of the ideal of free trade. 
FDI is an explanatory variable of complaining behaviour in earlier research on 28 countries 
but not in case of Eurasian nations, even if FDI is much higher in Eurasia. By now we can 
explain why, since FDI is not considered hostile in Eurasia, as it seems to be perceived in case 
of the 28 countries including South American countries and India.  
Our correlation analysis brought several interesting insights, of maybe which the most 
interesting is that complaining nations almost automatically face complaints to themselves: 
complaining  and responding are very strongly correlated. As to our regressions equations we 
need EU level data on IPR, CAB and FDI which have failed us to complete our analysis. For 
now the presented cases, the double sided role of FDI and the fact that complaining seems to 
induce complaining sheds light on our question if complaining is actually only induced by 
objective facts violating free trade or..? Complainers have to respond, responders complain, a 
never ending game in which we asked if motives for complaining are objective or related to 
other facts – Free trade in Eurasia for real? – or is home still where the heart is? 
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